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CIVIL PROCEDURE-LIMITATIONS ON THE EXTENSION
OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION-World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
In 1976 Mr. and Mrs. Robinson purchased a new Audi automobile
from Seaway Volkswagen, Inc., a New York corporation. The Robin-
sons were residents of New York at the time of the purchase and were
traveling through Oklahoma, to a new home in Arizona, when they
were involved in an accident. Their car was struck from behind, and
burst into flames severely injuring Mrs. Robinson and her two chil-
dren.'
The Robinsons brought a products liability action in the state of
Oklahoma, alleging that their injuries were the result of the defective-
ly designed fuel system of their automobile. Joined as defendants were
the automobile's retailer, Seaway Volkswagen, and its wholesale dis-
tributor, World-Wide Volkswagen, both New York corporations. Re-
spondents produced no evidence that either company did any business
in Oklahoma. No evidence was even produced that any of petitioners'
cars had entered the state other than the Audi involved in the litiga-
tion. After the trial court rejected their claims that Oklahoma's juris-
diction over them offended the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, petitioners World-Wide and Seaway sought a writ of pro-
hibition in that state's supreme court to restrain the trial judge (respon-
dent) from exercising jurisdiction over them.2 The writ was denied.3
The assertion of in personam jurisdiction was based upon Oklaho-
ma's "long-arm" statute.4 The trial judge held that the court had in
personam jurisdiction because in accordance with the requirements of
title 12, sections 1701.01-.03 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the petitioners
had derived "substantial revenue" from goods used within the state.
5
On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the lower court
'World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980).
21d. at 289.
3World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978).
4Long-arm statutes are so called because they confer jurisdiction upon a state court
over a nonresident whose activity falls within the purview of the statute. Oklahoma's
statute is adopted from the UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE
ACT 13 U.L.A. 1.03. See generally 62 Am. Jur. 2d Process §§79-81 (1972 and Supp.
1980).
'OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1701.03(a) (West 1971).
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly
or by an agent, as to a cause of action or claim for relief arising from the
person s:
(3) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission in this state;
(4) causing a tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this
state if he regularly does or solicits business or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from
goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state.... (em-
phasis added).
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was justified in its conclusion, and had the power, pursuant to the re-
quirements of section 1701.03(a)(4), to exercise personal jurisdiction
over the petitioners because alleged acts or omissions on the part of
petitioners outside the state allegedly caused tortious injury within the
state.
It must be noted that unlike those of some states, in order to confer
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident based on a "tortious injury"
occurring in the state, the Oklahoma statute required more than the
resulting injury. The act or omission must either have taken place
within the state or if it took place outside the state, must have been
accompanied by the conducting of business or other persistent course
of conduct in the state or derivation of substantial revenue from goods
used or services rendered there.7 Other statutes, often called one-act or
single-act statutes, extend jurisdiction to nonresidents for acts commit-
ted which have a certain result or effect in the state seeking to impose
jurisdiction, regardless of whether the acts were committed in or out-
side the state.' Mississippi's statute is among these.9
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court based its decision primarily
on the application and interpretation of the pertinent statute, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court in granting certiorari, stated that it sought to
resolve an important constitutional question. World-Wide would settle
the controversy over the extent and definition of minimum contacts
necessary to confer jurisdiction on a state court over a nonresident in a
products liability case.'" Even though the case could have been re-
'World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v Woodson, 585 P.2d at 354 (Okla. 1978).
'OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1701.03(a) (West 1971).
'See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 5-514 (b); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17-1 (Smith-Hurd
1955); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303 (West, Supp. 1981); MISS. CODE ANN § 13-3-57 (Supp.
1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-06.1-02(2) (Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT ANN. § 21-3-
16[A](3)(1967); ORE. REV. STAT. §14.305(1)(b) (1963); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15-7-
2(2) 1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-235 (b)(1968).
Long-arm statutes based on the UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PRO-
CEDURE ACT have provisions similar to those of Oklahoma. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. §
302(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979-80); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.38.2 (Page Supp.
1978); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Supp. 1979).
9MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (Supp. 1980). The pertinent portion provides:
Any nonresident person, firm, general or limited partnership, or any foreign or
other corporation not qualified under the constitution and laws of this state as to
doing business herein, who shall make a contract with a resident of this state to
be performed in whole or in part by any party in this state, or who shall commit
a tort in whole or in part in this state against a resident or nonresident of this
state, or who shall do any business or perform any character of work or service in
this state, shall by such act or acts be deemed to be doing business in Mississippi.
Such act or acts shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment by such nonresi-
dent of the secretary of state of the State of Mississippi, or his successor or succes-
sors in office, to be the tried and lawful attorney or agent of such nonresident
upon whom all lawful process may be served in any actions or proceedings ac-
crued or accruing from such act or acts, or arising from or growing out of such
contract or tort, or as an incident thereto, by any such nonresident or his, their, or
its agent, servant or employee.
1444 U.S. at 291.
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versed on the narrow ground that it was not shown the petitioners de-
rived "substantial revenue" from the use of their automobiles in Okla-
homa,1 the Supreme Court stressed that the proper approach was to
test jurisdiction against both statutory and constitutional standards, and
this approach should have been followed by the state court."
HISTORY OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENTS
While a consideration of "long-arm" statutes usually necessitates an
inquiry into adequate notice and service of process, the instant case
focused narrowly upon what activity constitutes sufficient contacts
with the forum state. Therefore, the discussion of the case law which
developed and defined such statutes will be limited to an overview of
the minimum contact theory.
The leading case in the early development of in personam jurisdic-
tion over nonresidents was Pennoyer v. Neff."5 This case propounded,
through Mr. Justice Field, the rigid rule that personal jurisdiction was
only proper within the borders of the sovereign state. 4 In language in
part gleaned from the 1850 case of D'Arcy v. Ketchum", the court in
Pennoyer held that an attempt to bind a nonresident who owned no
property within the forum was an "illegitimate assumption of power
and resisted as mere abuse."'" The court must have power over the
nonresident's person in order to bind him by a judgment of the court.
In the landmark case of Hess v. Pawloski," the United States Su-
preme Court upheld the extension of in personam jurisdiction over a
nonresident motorist on the theory of implied consent or appointment.
The acceptance by a nonresident of the rights and privileges conferred
by Massachusetts' motor vehicle and highway laws was deemed to be
equivalent to an appointment by the nonresident of that state's regis-
trar as his agent for service of process within the state. The court held
that in the public interest, the state may make and enforce regulations
reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of both residents
and nonresidents alike.'" Because of this principle of the forum's public
interest or "manifest interest"' 9 in regulating certain activities, this
"Id. at 298-99.
"Id. at 290.
"Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), over'd, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977). See also Minnesota Commercial Assn'n v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923).
195 U.S. at 720.
"D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850).
"95 U.S. 714 (construing D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 174).
1Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
"Id. at 356.
"McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). See also Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647-49; Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S.
623, 627.
19801
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case precipitated the development of long-arm statutes to cover situa-
tions where contracts had been entered into requiring at least part per-
formance in the state, or where tortious injury occurred in the state.
2"
The most important case in the history of "long-arm" statutes is the
case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.1 This case developed
the test by which the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
must be balanced when considering the province of the court in assert-
ing in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident. Due process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if
he is not found within the forum, "he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."22 The court went
further, defining the test as one which was concerned with the "qual-
ity and nature" of the activity as opposed to a "mechanical or quanti-
tative" test. International Shoe emphasized that due process requires
that a state not make binding an in personam judgment against a de-
fendant with which the state has no contacts, ties or relations. Howev-
er, the privilege of conducting activities within that state gives rise to
obligations; and if the obligations arise out of or are connected with
those activities, requiring the corporation to respond to a suit to en-
force them is hardly improper.
2
1
The flexible standard expounded in International Shoe was extended
in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co."4 The petitioner, a resident of
California, was the named beneficiary of an insurance policy pur-
chased by a California resident from an Arizona corporation. Subse-
quently, the Arizona corporation sought to release itself from its obli-
gations in California. The respondent, a Texas-based company, volun-
tarily agreed to assume those obligations. Neither company had an
agent or transacted any business in California except for the original
insurance contract, and the reinsurance certificate mailed to the Cali-
fornia resident from the Texas corporation. The petitioner's benefac-
tor, the insured, accepted the reinsurance certificate and mailed pay-
"See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13(3) (West Supp. 1969); MISS. CODE ANN. §13-
3-57 (Supp. 1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.38.2 (Page Supp. 1978).
tInternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The appellant had no
offices in the state of Washington, and maintained no stock of merchandise there, but
did employ resident salesmen on a commission basis who were supplied with samples
and solicited orders there. The Supreme Court held that these operations established
sufficient contacts or ties with the state of Washington to make it "'reasonable and just"
to permit the state to enforce the obligations the corporation had incurred there. Accord-
ing to the majority opinion, these activities were not irregular or casual, but systematic
and continuous, and resulted in a large amount of interstate business. Id.
22326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (emphasis
added). See also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Hutchinson v. Chase &
Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (1930).
2326 U.S. at 319.
24McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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ments directly to the respondent's office in Texas. The petitioner
sought and was awarded a judgment on the policy in California. The
Texas court refused to give it full faith and credit.
The Supreme Court noted the expansion of state jurisdiction over
nonresidents and attributed the liberalization in part, to the increasing
nationalization of commerce.2" It was held that the requisite minimum
contacts were satisfied by the isolated contract involved.2" The court in
McGee broadened state jurisdiction to is outer reaches-limited only
by the relaxed criteria of minimum contacts.
One year after McGee, in Hanson v. Denckla,2" the Supreme Court
halted the trend toward expanding the scope of personal jurisdiction.
The settlor became domiciled in the forum, and the corporate trustee
sent income from the trust to her in that state. The settlor also made
some changes in the trust and executed two powers of appointment.
However, according to the court, there was no evidence that the trust-
ee performed "any acts in Florida that would bear the same relation-
ship to the agreement as the solicitation in McGee."' Jurisdiction was
restricted by requiring not only certain minimal contacts, but also that
the nonresident perform some act whereby it purposefully sought to
avail itself of the benefits and protections of the forum state's laws.29
This requirement of purposefulness would later be interpreted by
some courts as being satisfied if a product were put into the "ordinary
course of commerce." 30
Response to International Shoe
Following the relaxation of standards for state jurisdiction in Inter-
national Shoe, some states sought to expand their power over nonresi-
dents by interpreting the purposeful requirement of Hanson and the
minimum contacts rule of International Shoe liberally. In Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,"' the Supreme Court
"Id. at 222-23.
2Id. at 223.
'Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Florida courts sought to exercise jurisdiction
over nonresident trustees on the basis that the settlor, most of the appointees and benefi-
ciaries were domiciled in the forum. The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was not
acquired by being the "center of gravity" of the controversy, or the most convenient
location for litigation. It is the acts of the trustee, not the unilateral acts of the resident
that must be examined. Id.
11357 U.S. at 252.
"Id. (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319 (1945)).
"See, e.g., Dawkins v. White Products Corp., 443 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1971); Duple
Motor Bodies v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969); Eyerly Aircraft Co. v.
Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969); Williams v. Vick Chem. Co., 279 F. Supp. 833
(S.D. Iowa 1967); Tate v. Renault, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. Tenn. 1967), affd, 402
F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1968); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113, 458 P.2d 57 (1969); Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of America, 93 Idaho 26,
454 P.2d 63 (1969); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Smith v. Temco, Inc., 252 So. 2d 212 (Miss. 1971).
3'22 11. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
19801
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of Illinois held that the purposeful act need not directly benefit the
nonresident. The activity may be indirect, as when a product is put
into the "ordinary course of commerce"" and is sold to the ultimate
consumer in the forum state, through a middleman. In addition, the
court ruled that a tort is actionable where the injury occurred, or the
last event takes place which is necessary to render the actor liable,
thereby bringing the occurrence within the purview of the Illinois
long-arm statute.8 3
Buckeye Boiler v. Superior Court34 equated engaging in economic
activity within the state "as a matter of commercial actuality" with
the purposeful activity requirement of Hanson. This type of economic
activity was said to occur "whenever the purchase or use of its product
within the state generates gross income for the manufacturer and is
not so fortuitous or unforeseeable as to negative the existence of an
intent on the manufacturer's part to bring about this result."35 Buck-
eye's economic activity consisted of both the large volume of sales of
its pressure tanks to customers in California and its indirect sales to
customers outside the state for foreseeable resale or use in the forum.3
In 1969, the same year that Buckeye Boiler was decided, a federal
district court in Minnesota decided the case of Uppgren v. Executive
Aviation Services.37 This case represents a restrictive application of In-
ternational Shoe and was cited approvingly in World-Wide. The court
was applying a Minnesota "one-act" provision." It was held that the
only contact the nonresident had with the state was the helicopter
crash in which the resident Uppgren died.39 The court reasoned that
the contact with the forum was insufficient to grant in personam juris-
diction. Further, the court declared that a single product which inflicts
injury in the forum, will not cause the nonresident to be amenable to
in personam jurisdiction "in the absence of any additional facts."4
Supreme Court's Attempt at Clarification
Finally, in Shaffer v. Heitner" and Kulko v. Superior Court," the
3id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
'3ld. at 762-63. Gray turned on the Illinois court's interpretation of section 17-1(b) of
the Illinois Statutes. That section empowers the courts to exercise jurisdiction over non-
residents who commit a tortious act within the state, with no express provision for such
acts committed outside the state. A "tortious act" was interpreted as including the last
event taking place which is necessary to render the actor liable, i.e., the injury itself.
'Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 458 P.2d 57
(1969).
'80 Cal. Rptr. at 120, 458 P.2d at 64.
3680 Cal. Rptr. at 121, 458 P.2d at 65.
'Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, 304 F. Supp. 165 (D. Minn. 1969).
3 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13(3) (West Supp. 1981).
'304 F. Supp. 165.
'1304 F. Supp. at 170.
4 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
4 Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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Supreme Court attempted to clarify the evolution of in personam juris-
diction. In Shaffer, the court made it clear that whether it is personal
jurisdiction or quasi in rem jurisdiction that is being asserted, the mini-
mum contact standard"3 of International Shoe and the purposeful re-
quirement" of Hanson must be met, as well as the foreseeablility or
reasonable expectation of being sued in the forum.45 However, which
of the three tests was the central inquiry remained unanswered. In
Kulko, the consequences or the effect of a defendant's conduct was
held to be a factor, but it must be coupled with such conduct as would
make it foreseeable that he might be haled into a court in that state. 46
The defendant had not engaged in any commercial activity from
which he sought some benefit. Mere acquiesence on the part of the
defendant in his ex-wife's decision to move to another state and take
their minor child with her, did not constitute the type of purposeful
activity contemplated by Hanson.47
The proper assertion of in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents
has been permeated with uncertainty since the flexible standard of In-
ternational Shoe was announced. In Kulko, the court expressed its own
concern:
Like any standard that requires a determination of "reasonableness,"
the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe is not susceptible of
mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed
to determine whether the requisite "affiliating circumstances" are pre-
sent. [citations omitted] We recognize that this determination is one in
which few answers will be written in black and white. The greys are
dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable."
THE WORLD-WIDE DECISION
The application of the law found in International Shoe and its
progeny is difficult in light of the current nationalized marketing of
products. 49 The determination of when a nonresident has sufficient
"minimum contacts" is one which is subject to many different theor-
ies. If the instant case makes at least one clear statement, it is that the
several states are not free to legislate away state sovereignty and due
process of law in their attempt to expand their jurisdiction over citi-
zens of other states. Pennoyer may have been rejected, but some of the
principles which formed its foundation are inherent in our system of
law.
In its six-three decision, the United States Supreme Court dealt with
the application of law to a fact situation in which there was an isolated
"433 U.S. at 212.
"Id. at 216.
451d.
"436 U.S. at 96-98.
4'436 U.S. at 94.
41Id. at 92.
"1355 U.S. at 222-223.
19801
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW
occurrence, and "in the absence of any additional facts""0 this was held
not to confer in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident. Further the
court noted and decided to "resolve a conflict between the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma and the highest courts of at least four other
states."51 The court attempted to use the instant case as a vehicle to
clarify the law in this area so as to avoid future conflicting applica-
tions. After a summary of the pivotal cases, the Supreme Court applied
the established case law to the facts of a case where the only contact
with the forum was the automobile accident in which the plaintiffs
were injured. The court proceeded to distinguish the criteria required
for sufficient minimum contacts from the factors present in World-
Wide.
The Oklahoma court, to assert in personam jurisdiction pursuant to
its statute, found that the petitioners did derive "substantial" revenue
from the use of their cars in other states, including Oklahoma.52 The
Supreme Court, however found the revenue to be "collateral," "mar-
ginal" and in any event too "attenuated" a contact upon which to sub-
stantiate an exercise of in personam jurisdiction.5" This statement
points out that notwithstanding statutory provisions, when revenue is
received, whatever contacts exist must still be judged as to their nature
and quality under International Shoe, and not measured by the
"amount" derived.5 The majority of the court, speaking through Mr.
Justice White, found an "apparent paucity of contacts,""5 save the sin-
gle fortuitous circumstance involved,56 and therefore reversed the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's finding.
As to the element of foreseeability, it is readily apparent that an
automobile is mobile and capable of traveling to any state in the
union. However, the majority enunciated that foreseeability does not
"304 F. Supp. at 170.
"See Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624
(1972) (where sale took place within the state to a state resident with notice that the
automobile was to be used in different state, contacts held to be insufficient); Tilley v.
Keller Truck & Implement Corp., 200 Kan. 641, 438 P.2d 128 (1968) (held insufficient
contact where a truck sold by resident dealer to resident purchaser used to transport
cattle to another state and purchaser was injured in different state on return trip); Pelle-
grini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (1974) (automobile sold in California by local dealer
to state resident, held insufficient contact standing alone to subject dealer to suit in Utah
where accident occurred); Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wash. 2d 875, 425 P.2d
647 (1967) (automobile sold by local retailer to resident purchaser allegedly causing in-
jury to purchaser in state of Washington, held insufficient contact with state for imposi-
tion of jurisdiction).
S585 P.2d at 354.
3444 U.S. at 299.
""However, financial benefits accruing to the defendant from a collateral relation to
the forum State will not support jurisdiction if they do not stem from a constitutionally





mean the mere possibility of a product terminating in another jurisdic-
tion. Rather, it exists only when "the defendant's conduct and connec-
tion with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there."" The underlying principle is that a non-
resident should be able to structure his conduct so as to avoid liability
in a distant forum."
While the manufacturer and the importer did not prosecute an ap-
peal, the Supreme Court did address the different relationships among
those involved in the chain of distribution of the automobile in ques-
tion. The Court reasoned that if the manufacturer and importer at-
tempted to serve the market of the several states either directly or
indirectly, they would be reasonably subject to suit in Oklahoma. This
would satisfy the test of "purposefulness" in seeking to avail them-
selves of the privilege and benefit of conducting activities in the forum
state; and it would not be unreasonable to subject them to suit in one
of those states if their product was the source of injury there. 9 It was
noted that the manufacturer and importer delivered the product into
the stream of commerce with the expectation that it be purchased ulti-
mately by consumers in Oklahoma and other states. Petitioner Sea-
way's sales were limited to the state of New York and petitioner
World-Wide's market covered only a tri-state area. Even though cus-
tomers might carry the product to other states, petitioners did not de-
liver them into this multi-state network.6
Justice Brennan's dissent attacked the Court's distinction between
the purposeful activity of the manufacturer and importer, and the ac-
tivity of the petitioners. He was of the opinion that when a consumer,
using the product as the dealer knew he would, takes it into another
state, the product is put into the stream of commerce just as much as if
placed in the seller's chain of distribution. 1
ANALYSIS
"The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment limits the
power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a
nonresident defendant. '" 6' The World-Wide decision reaffirmed that a
state court may exercise personal jurisdiction consistently with due
process, only so long as there exist certain minimum contacts between
the defendant and the forum.6" Although several tests have been pro-
pounded, it is clear after World-Wide, that minimum contacts is the
57433 U.S. at 216.
18444 U.S. at 297, 326 U.S. at 216.
9Id. at 297-98. Compare Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22
I11. 2d 432, N.E.2d 761 (1961).
"I1d. at 298.
61444 U.S. at 306-307 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62444 U.S. at 291 (citing Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978)).
444 U.S. at 291.
1980]
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central and pre-dominant inquiry. Even if the forum state has a strong
interest or is the most convenient situs, or if the defendant would not
actually be inconvenienced or only minimally so, the requisite contacts
must exist to make the imposition of jurisdiction comport with due
process."4
Other factors discussed in the line of cases following International
Shoe are fairness and reasonableness, foreseeability and purposefulness.
The World-Wide court sees all of these as falling within the minimum
contacts test. What is fair and reasonable for the defendant is deter-
mined by the nature and quality of its ties and relations with the for-
um. The court was seemingly of the opinion that if the minimum con-
tacts test is met the fairness test is also met. The relationship must be
such that it is reasonable to require the defendant to be subject to suit
there."5 Fundamental fairness or reasonableness is not sufficient to es-
tablish jurisdiction if the proper contacts are lacking.
66
The foreseeability element is deemed insufficient by the World-
Wide court to serve as a standard for the exercise of jurisdiction. 7 It
was argued that an automobile is uniquely mobile and it is foreseeable
that it would travel to other jurisdictions; however, according to the
majority, if foreseeability were the criterion, a seller of chattels "would
in effect appoint the chattel his agent for service of process." ' Even
though foreseeability was deemed not to be totally inapplicable it was
defined in terms of the conduct of the defendant. If minimum con-
tacts exist, the next inquiry is whether the conduct and connection are
such that the defendant should "reasonably anticipate" being subjected
to suit in the forum state.9
One aspect of the contacts the defendant must have with the state is
the purposeful attempt to exercise the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum. To meet the minimum contacts test, purposeful-
ness is essential. The majority opinion agreed that the activity was pur-
poseful if the defendant injected a product into the stream of com-
merce with the expectation that it be sold to consumers in the forum
state," but rejected the notion that the mere unilateral activity on the
"Id. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 251, 254 (1958)).
'Id. at 292 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
"Id. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 251, 254 (1958)).
6"Id. at 297.
"Id. at 296. See Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42, 492
P.2d 624 (1972). This case was cited with approval in World-Wide. The plaintiff-buyer
had informed the automobile retailer that she intended to use the car in another state.
Although the dealer clearly had knowledge of the car's destination, jurisdiction was de-
nied. Id.
"Id. at 297. See Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); In Kulko it
was foreseeable that an ex-wife would relocate to another state with a minor child but in
an action for child support, jurisdiction over the huband who stayed behind, was denied.
436 U.S. 84.
11444 U.S. at 297.
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part of the purchaser resulting in the product being used in the forum
would be sufficient. It did not constitute purposeful actvity on the part
of the nonresident defendant.
The dissenting justices were of the opinion that the defendants had
sufficient contacts and connection with Oklahoma. The petitioners
benefitted from the nationwide network of service centers located
throughout the United States and further, the automobile is expected
to be used in states other than where it was purchased.
Justice Brennan also argued that the relevant inquiry should be
whether "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" are
offended.7 The majority seemed to be of the opinion that if sufficient
contacts exist, fairness is met. According to Mr. Justice Brennan, it is
fairness which is the key to due process, and the minimum contacts
test was only one way of determining whether the assertion of jurisdic-
tion was fair to the defendant."2 If, after weighing the strength of the
forum state's interest in the case and the actual burden or inconve-
nience to the defendant, the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant
is deemed to be fair, jurisdiction should be allowed, even if there are
not minimum contacts.
In weighing the forum state's interest in and connection with the
litigation, the dissent pointed out that the plaintiffs were hospitalized
in Oklahoma, that witnesses and evidence were located there, and the
state had an interest in enforcing its laws and keeping its highway
system safe. The petitioners also had connection with Oklahoma. Even
though they operated within limited sales territories, the automobile
they had sold was in fact driven into the forum. The petitioners' "com-
mercial impact"7 could not realistically be confined to that limited
territory. According to the dissent, automobile dealers not only foresee
that the vehicles they sell will move and travel, but intend that they
will. An automobile dealer also derives substantial benefit from the use
of its automobiles in other states, and from the network of dealership
and service centers located throughout the nation. The petitioners
chose to become part of a nationwide network for marketing and ser-
vicing automobiles. 4 Thus the cars were purposefully injected into the
stream of interstate commerce.
In today's world of mobility, transportation and commerce, no busi-
ness, no matter how local, is confined in its impact and distribution of
goods to its geographic locality. The society of 1958, when Interna-
tional Shoe was decided, has changed substantially. Brennan expressed
711d. at 298. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 11. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
72"'The existence of contacts, so long as there were some, was merely one way of giv-
ing content to the determination of fairness and reasonableness." 444 U.S. at 300 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 314 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the view that in today's world, the interests of the forum and other
parties should be entitled to as much weight as the interests of the
defendant. Minimum contacts should exist "among the parties, the
contested transaction, and the forum state." T
CONCLUSION
World-Wide has made it clear that whenever jurisdiction is sought
to be asserted over a nonresident defendant, the minimum contacts
standard of International Shoe must be met. This is true regardless of
the statutory scheme of the forum state. The World-Wide decision
reaffirms Kulko, which held that statutes utilizing the effect test were
not unconstitutional so long as the proper contacts with the forum exist
so as to make it reasonable that a nonresident be required to defend
there. Yet it sharply restricts the application of the effect test, holding
that so-called "one-act", "single-act" or "one-tort" statutes will be
deemed to have been unconstitutionally applied if the requisite con-
tacts were not present.
Regardless of the modern mechanisms of commerce and the inter-
relationships of the states, jurisdiction over nonresidents cannot be ex-
panded beyond constitutional bounds. These bounds are delineated by
International Shoe. The minimum contacts standard not only protects
the defendant from inconvenience and undue burden, but also serves
to maintain the sovereign integrity of the individual states. These im-
portant principles could not be sacrificed to the practicalities of mod-
ern commerce and interstate movement, according to the majority
opinion.
After World-Wide the focus is on minimum contacts, with purpose-
fulness being an essential ingredient. Putting a product into the stream
of commerce meets the purposeful requirement. However, this deci-
sion more clearly defines what this means, stating that there must have
been an intent or expectation that the product would ultimately be
sold in the forum stae. It is also evident after World-Wide that fore-
seeability alone is an insufficient standard, and comes into play mainly
in adjudging fairness to the defendant and purposefulness.
Concepts which are not given much weight in the instant case are
the strength of the forum state's interest in the case, the burden upon
the plaintiff in bringing suit in New York as opposed to Oklahoma,
and practical factors which tend to lessen the degree of the actual bur-
den on the defendant. As Justice Brennan points out, these too, are
important considerations. The inquiry into whether "traditional no-
tions of fair play" or "substantial justice" have been offended, ought
also to have some application to the injured plaintiff.
Richard E. Santora
7 Id. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 225
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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